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The Allure and Danger of Practicing Law as
Taxonomy
Marcia L. McCormick*
I. INTRODUCTION
This country’s approaches to the problem of discrimination,
the laws we have enacted to resolve that problem, and the way
that courts have interpreted those laws have been extensively
criticized.1 While these critiques are related and form some of
the basis for the critique presented here, this article accepts for
the moment the positive law and structure already in place.2
Rather than attempting to provide any definitive answer to these
large issues, which is a project for another day, this article
*
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. For their
suggestions, assistance with resources, and comments on prior drafts of this article, I would
like to thank Katharine Baker, Mark Bauer, Howard Eglit, Doug Godfrey, Sanford
Greenberg, Dan Hamilton, Sarah Harding, Hal Krent, Martin Malin, Nancy Marder, Joe
Morrissey, John O’Connell, Michael Pardo, Joan Steinman, Mary Rose Strubbe, and
Carolyn Shapiro. I would also like to thank all of the members of the Chicago-Kent faculty
who participated in a workshop on this paper. Thanks, as well, to Paul Mollica, who
allowed me to use his summary of employment discrimination cases, which was a valuable
research tool. Finally, thank you to David Leavitt for outstanding research assistance. Any
errors, technical or substantive, are mine alone.
1. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 2-43 (2001) [hereinafter
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY] (providing a feminist critique of formal equality in the
context of sex discrimination law); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 215-34 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE]; Derrick Bell, An Allegorical Critique of the United States Civil Rights Model,
in DISCRIMINATION: THE LIMITS OF LAW 3, 11 (Bob Hepple & Erika M. Szyszczak eds.,
1992); Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 121 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) [hereinafter
Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law]; Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) [hereinafter Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination]; D. Marvin Jones, No Time for Trumpets: Title VII, Equality, and
the Fin de Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2311, 2334-44 (1994); Robert Post, Prejudicial
Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-19
(2000).
2. It is possible, and perhaps probable, that the only way to correct our approach to
discrimination is to develop an entirely new socio-legal approach.
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focuses more narrowly on the basic framework for evaluating
employment discrimination cases at the summary judgment
stage, and suggests a way to reform that framework with the
goal of developing a more workable model.
One of the things that we all learn in law school is that
lawyers love multi-part tests, multi-factor analyses, and shifting
burdens. We love to break problems into smaller and smaller
pieces, and then rearrange those pieces to best serve our
purposes. Perhaps we use this process as a way to establish
order in a chaotic world or as a way to make our subjective
judgments seem more scientific. Perhaps it is a way to feel like
we are using the expertise we spent so much time, sweat, and
money developing. Perhaps it just makes us feel smart.
Whatever the reason, the process is as natural to us as breathing.
But what happens when we get so caught up in the process
that we lose sight of the ends that process was originally
designed to serve? It would seem that when the means become
self-serving or when they actually frustrate the ends they were
originally intended to serve, we must discard them and refocus
on a new way to serve those ends. To do otherwise would not
only frustrate achieving the desired ends, but also might
camouflage the fact that the ends are not actually being served.
Sometimes, we have to start over from scratch.
We have reached this point in employment discrimination.
The multi-part, burden-shifting test designed as a “sensible,
orderly way to evaluate the evidence”3 in an employment
discrimination case has taken over how we define
discrimination, and the Supreme Court itself has finally fallen
into the trap. It is not necessarily that the test is too difficult for
courts to apply.4 On the contrary, the McDonnell Douglas Corp.
3. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). The test was created
by the Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), and is
commonly referred to as the “McDonnell Douglas” test. See infra notes 61-81 and
accompanying text.
4. Several scholars have argued that the McDonnell Douglas test is too difficult to
apply, and cite to cases in which courts bemoan the difficult time they are having. See,
e.g., Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified
Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 660-73
(1998); Ernest F. Lidge, III, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in
Requiring Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove That the Employer’s Action Was
Materially Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 333, 342 n.45 (1999); Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229,

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=708526

DTP.FIN.MCCORMICK.DOC

2005]

DANGER OF LAW AS TAXONOMY

4/5/2005 1:55 PM

161

v. Green5 test [hereinafter “McDonnell Douglas test”] is
satisfying, even fun, to apply and encourages lawyers and courts
to get so caught up in principles promoted by the test that they
lose sight of the law. Rather than being a way to assess the
evidence in order to discover whether an inference can be made
that the law has been violated, the test has replaced the law and
redefined what discrimination means. By eclipsing the law, the
test has made it nearly impossible to combat discrimination in
all but the most egregious cases. Thus, it is time to recalibrate
how we view the evidence that might prove discrimination in
order to reorient ourselves to what discrimination actually is.
Part II of this article examines “discrimination” by looking
at legal definitions and to the work of social psychologists. Part
III then traces the development of the current analytical structure
for employment discrimination cases. Part IV explains how the
ubiquity of the current test has caused courts to substitute it for
the laws they are supposed to apply, resulting in the
misapplication of antidiscrimination laws and an overreliance on
summary judgment. Finally, Part V proposes reformulating the
test, making it clear that in summary judgment proceedings or
proceedings to set aside a judgment, the explicit question for the
court should be: would a minimally rational factfinder be
required to find that the employer took an adverse employment
action against the plaintiff solely for reasons unrelated to
discrimination or discriminatory beliefs? In other words, only if
a minimally rational factfinder were required to find that the
employer acted solely for reasons unrelated to discrimination
would the employer be granted summary judgment or the
judgment of the jury be set aside. Otherwise, the case should
either proceed to a trial, or the judgment of the jury should
stand. At trial, the trier of fact should focus simply on whether
the plaintiff has shown that the employer took the adverse job
action at least in part for a reason related to discrimination. This
test restores the original understanding of courts that employers
2232-39 (1995). I would submit that the problem is not that the test itself is difficult to
apply; instead, courts simply do not believe that satisfying the test is enough to prove
discrimination. Accord Robert J. Gregory, There is Life in That Old (I Mean, More
“Senior”) Dog Yet: The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 391, 423-24 (1994).
5. 411 U.S. 792; see supra note 3.
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generally act for some reason, and, when the most common
reasons for an adverse employment action are rejected, all that
remains is an inference that discrimination was the real reason.
The ultimate burden on the plaintiff would be the same, and the
employer would retain the same opportunity to argue that it had
a legitimate reason for the action taken. However, the plaintiff
would have a greater chance to influence how the court defines
discrimination, and the court’s perspective would better reflect
the pervasive and subtle nature of discrimination in the
workplace.
II. DISCRIMINATION
Discrimination, at its most basic and benign level, is the act
of differentiating.6 We discriminate all of the time in order to
function.7 In a positive sense, we discriminate between foods
that are poisonous and those which are not in order to live. In a
less beneficial, but still benign sense, we discriminate between
the colors we like and those which we do not in decorating our
living spaces. In a legal sense, we typically use discrimination
to mean the unequal treatment of people, an act that often has
far-reaching effects. While this is an informal definition of
discrimination that most people would agree on, there is no
societal consensus on what kind of discrimination the law
should prohibit.
Players within the United States legal system have a rather
narrow definition of equality and a narrow view of the role that
government may legitimately play in ensuring equality. As a
general rule, our legal system tends to protect equality of
opportunity, or formal equality, rather than substantive equality.8
As a result, our working definition of illegal discrimination
focuses on what is in the mind of a particular decision-maker at
6. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 411 (4th ed. 2000) (defining
discrimination as “distinguishing differences”).
7. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1163-64 (1995).
8. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 41 (2d ed.
1980); MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 1, at 215-34. Other
scholars have labeled this distinction as deliberate exclusion rather than structural or
institutional discrimination.
See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 467-69 (2001).
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the time a decision is made.9 Illegal discrimination is generally
thought of, in a doctrinal sense, as the self-aware,10 intentional
treatment of a particular person because of a single-dimensioned
characteristic that is both irrelevant, at least to the decision being
made, and also outside of the person’s control.11 This is the type
of discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause has been
interpreted to prohibit, and this model has been the basis for our
antidiscrimination statutes.
While this intentional discrimination model is the
paradigm, legislators, courts, and scholars have recognized that
the government might appropriately work to provide a more
substantive equality.12 This approach tends to focus on the
effects of particular actions, rather than on the intent of the
actors.13 As a result, some actions will be considered illegal
discrimination if their effects perpetuate a system of inequality,
even if the actors did not have the specific, fully self-aware
intent to treat people badly based on a prohibited characteristic.
This latter model more accurately reflects how we as

9. Krieger, supra note 7, at 1168-77. The focus changes just a little when the
validity of legislation is at issue. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971).
Rather than looking at the intent of the legislators, we look primarily to the words of the
legislation to evaluate discriminatory purpose. Id. Similarly, when the application of
legislation is challenged, we look to the patterns of application and use those to infer
discriminatory purpose. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
10. Linda Hamilton Krieger calls this “transparency of mind,” or a person’s ability to
accurately identify why that person made a particular decision. See Krieger, supra note 7,
at 1167, 1185-86. This rule is applied differently when legislation, rather than an
individual action, is being analyzed. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224-25. For legislation, the
real intent of any particular legislator is irrelevant, and it is the language of the legislation
that matters. Id.
11. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 288, 291-94 (1997).
12. An example of a legislative effort to provide substantive equality might be the
disparate impact provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(2) (2000). Cases interpreting this provision focus on the effects of employer actions.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). An additional example of a court
focusing on effects rather than intent is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
in which the Supreme Court looked at the effects of racial segregation in education and
determined that such segregation caused harm and was unconstitutional. For examples of
scholarly discussions of substantive equality, see Kimberle’ Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1341 (1988); Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 1, at
124-26.
13. See supra note 12.
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humans actually discriminate.14 The things in our world contain
infinite variations and if we were constantly confronted with
having to process the impact of each variation we would not be
able to function.15 To cope, we define categories of things, and
then quickly sort that which we encounter into those established
categories.16 We then use the definition of the categories to
explain what the “thing” we have encountered is, and how it is
likely to act or be acted upon.17
Assigning a “thing” to a group or creating group identity
has far-reaching effects. For instance, we perceive objects
belonging to a defined group as more similar to each other, and
more unlike things outside of the group, than we would if the
objects were not attached to a group.18 Studies have shown that
when individuals are assigned group identities, even on an
arbitrary basis, these effects are personalized: the individuals
see members of their own group (the ingroup) as more like
themselves, and others (the outgroup) as more different from
themselves than they would in the absence of the group
identity.19 Additionally, they are much less able to see

14. The former view of discrimination may actually have been an accurate model of
how people discriminated when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. Ann C.
McGinley, ¡Viva la Évolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 418, 426-27 (2000) (suggesting that overt discrimination was
prevalent until 1964, after which people learned not to engage in such discrimination but
were not made to examine their cognitive processes to root out stereotypes and more subtle
forms of discrimination).
15. See Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1-2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977).
16. See Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND
CATEGORIZATION 27, 28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978).
17. Krieger, supra note 7, at 1188-89.
18. See id. at 1186 (citing studies by: Donald T. Campbell, Enhancement of Contrast
as Composite Habit, 53 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 355 (1956); Henri Tajfel,
Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 83-86 (1969); and Henri Tajfel &
A.L. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative Judgment, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104
(1963)).
19. See Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup
Discrimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS
160, 161-62, 167-68 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); Anne Locksley
et al., Social Categorization and Discriminatory Behavior: Extinguishing the Minimal
Intergroup Discrimination Effect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773, 776-83
(1980); David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group: Categorization and Intergroup
Relations, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 213,
217 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981).
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differences among members of the outgroup.20 Groups are
created by the salience of characteristics. Once a characteristic
becomes salient (matters or makes a difference), like gender or
race, that characteristic defines a group; however, individuals
define what is salient in any given context.21
These cognitive structures create the tendency to
stereotype, and stereotypes are essentially cognitive shortcuts
that link personal traits with group membership, in order “to
simplify the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining
information about people in memory.”22 Once set, stereotypes
bias “in predictable ways the perception, interpretation,
encoding, retention, and recall of information about other
people” and influence judgment continuously.23 Like salience,
which defines groupness in the first place, we decide what
behaviors to attribute to particular groups.24
Stereotypes create expectations that bias the way
individuals perceive others, remember things about others, and
assign cause to the actions of others.25 We determine whether a
particular person is suited for a job by comparing the stereotypes
we associate with that person to the stereotypes we associate
with the job.26 We also tend to remember the things a person
20. David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An
Overview of the Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 127,
131 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
21. That is not to say that in every instance individuals make a conscious choice
about what characteristics matter. Conscious adoption could happen, but it is also likely
that individuals absorb information from exposure to the culture in which they live. See
HOWARD J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973).
22. Krieger, supra note 7, at 1187-88; see also Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate
Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321-22 (2000). While this
description of what stereotypes are may sound very benign, stereotypes in a society with
power imbalances such as ours operate to perpetuate and even aggravate such imbalances.
23. Krieger, supra note 7, at 1188.
24. Again, this decision could be consciously adopted or learned through exposure to
culture. David L. Hamilton, A Cognitive-Attributional Analysis of Stereotyping, in 12
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 53, 64 (Leonard Berkowitz ed.,
1979).
25. See Krieger, supra note 7, at 1200-09.
26. Id. at 1200-04. Krieger uses the example of a small woman with paralegal
training and a large man with physical education training both applying for the position of
police officer to illustrate this point. Id. at 1200. If our stereotype of a police officer
includes a physically imposing person, we would be more likely to perceive the large man
as a better candidate. Id. at 1201. On the other hand, if our stereotype of a police officer
includes a person able to defuse tense situations or apply the law correctly to particular
conduct, we would be more likely to perceive the smaller woman with legal training as the
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actually did that fit our stereotypes of that person; we believe we
remember a person doing things consistent with the stereotypes
even if the person never did them, and we forget the things
about them that do not conform to those stereotypes.27
Additionally, we assign causes to the actions of people in
accordance with our stereotyped expectations. For instance, we
assume a person who acts consistently with a stereotype did so
because of innate characteristics, while we assume that a person
who acts inconsistently with a stereotype did so because of
transitional or situational factors.28
Thus, discrimination is accomplished, at least in part,
through an ongoing process of interaction that often happens
outside of a person’s normal self-awareness, and which
manifests in many small things over time, and may culminate in
larger actions. Yet, stereotypes do not function entirely
automatically and can be controlled by conscious effort.29
Therefore, even though some discrimination may happen
without full, contemporaneous self-awareness, discrimination is
still an appropriate subject of regulation by the government.30
Based on this social science research showing that the
doctrinal model of discrimination is inaccurate, a wave of
scholarly criticism has recently focused on that model and the
better candidate. Id.
27. See Krieger, supra note 7, at 1206-10; see also Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel,
Traits as Prototypes: Effects on Recognition Memory, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 38, 41-45 (1977).
28. See Krieger, supra note 7, at 1204-07. A good example of such attribution bias is
given by Joan C. Williams. See Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping:
Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the
“Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 433-34 (2003). Because
women with children are presumed to put their children as their first priority, when such a
woman is late to work, her boss is likely to assume that the presumed innate characteristic,
priority of childcare responsibilities, was the cause. Because men are assumed to put work
first, a man who is late for work is assumed to have been caught in traffic, a transitional
cause. Id.
29. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 244-47, 255-56 (2002); McGinley, supra note
14, at 430-32.
30. See Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?,
7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 478 (2003) (analogizing liability for
discrimination caused by cognitive bias to the law related to invisible dangerous conditions
on land); Michael Selmi, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J.
1233, 1233-34 (1999). But see Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J.
1129, 1131-34 (1999).
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courts’ adherence to it to enforce our antidiscrimination laws.31
As the next section demonstrates, there is nothing in our positive
law that requires this model, and so courts are free to adopt a
definition of discrimination that comports with how social
science tells us discrimination operates. And yet, courts have
done so very rarely. I submit that the reason is because the
analytical structure itself hides the issue of discrimination, so
that litigants never have a chance to challenge the judges’
assumptions about what discrimination is.
III. LEGAL RESPONSES TO DISCRIMINATION
The first legal mechanisms created to address social
inequality and the problems of discrimination came at the end of
the Civil War and during Reconstruction.32 While there were
31. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 91-94
(2003); Krieger, supra note 7, at 1241-48; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987);
McGinley, supra note 14, at 430-32; Sturm, supra note 8, at 468; Williams, supra note 28,
at 433-37.
32. Before this time, states used the law to enforce inequality by prohibiting antislavery speech, prohibiting the education of Black people, restricting the power of
manumission, prohibiting Black people from testifying in court, and prohibiting the
presence of free Black people in slave-holding and free western states.
THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS iiiv (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES];
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-84 (1861), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 29; CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 167787, 1839 (1860), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note
32, at 20-29; CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 948, 951-53, 970, 974-75, 980, 982-87,
1006 (1859), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32,
at 14-19; CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 402, 1967 (1858), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 13; CONG. GLOBE, 34th
Cong., 3d Sess. 140 (1857), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES,
supra note 32, at 12; CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 124, 1598 (1856), reprinted in
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 12; CONG. GLOBE,
33d Cong., 1st Sess. 234, 240, 1012-13, 1155, 1556 (1854), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 11; CONG. GLOBE, 31st
Cong., 1st Sess. 123-24, 288-89, 482, 1654-64, 1674-78, 2066 (1850), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 10; CONG. GLOBE, 30th
Cong., 2d Sess. 418-19 (1849), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’
DEBATES, supra note 32, at 1.
The federal government also promoted discrimination by, for example, not
allowing Black people equal pay for military service or for carrying the mail. THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at iv-v. The United States
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some steps forward during the Civil War,33 the most notable
developments came after, with the Thirteenth,34 Fourteenth,35
and Fifteenth36 Amendments to the United States Constitution.37
Supreme Court reinforced these kinds of measures. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393, 454 (1857) (holding that Black people were not citizens and therefore not
entitled to the protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV, Section 2
of the United States Constitution); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 16, 21 (1852)
(upholding as constitutional a provision in the Illinois Constitution prohibiting the
immigration of free Black people to the state).
33. Massachussetts, for example, abolished segregation by race on streetcars and in
schools. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 79.
34. The Thirteenth Amendment provides: “Section 1. Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
35. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws . . . .
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
36. The Fifteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
37. Although these Reconstruction Amendments are viewed generally as instruments
of racial equality, the abolitionist and women’s rights movements overlapped significantly,
and many hoped that women’s rights would benefit. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.,
3d Sess. 708-10 (1869), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES,
supra note 32, at 346 (discussing an amendment proposed by Senator Pomeroy to grant
suffrage to all citizens including women); NELL IRVIN PAINTER, SOJOURNER TRUTH 22033 (1996) (describing the overlap and the role Sojourner Truth played in both movements);
Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women’s Subordination and the
Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 126. One reason for the overlap
could be that distinctions based on sex were well accepted and were used to justify
distinctions made on race and color. MILTON R. KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS
128 (1961). Another reason may be that women formed extensive religious and secular
welfare associations because that was encouraged by the cult of domesticity dominant at
the time. Taub & Schneider, supra note 37, at 162.
Although there was tension between members of both movements over the issue
of which group deserved equality more, members of both movements argued that these
amendments would grant equal rights for women, as well. Their hopes were dashed when
the word “male” was used in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, providing that
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The effect of these amendments was quickly narrowed,38 and
representation in Congress would be restricted for any state where the franchise was
abridged for “any . . . male inhabitants . . . , being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of
the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. This marked the first time that
gender was introduced into the Constitution. See H.R. REP. NO. 41-22 (1871) (reporting
the majority view that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit discrimination against
women in exercising the right to vote, and the minority view that disagreed on the ground
that voting was a privilege and immunity of citizenship), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 466-71; S. REP. NO. 42-21
(1872) (reporting the unanimous view of the Senate that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments did not give women the right to vote and that denial of women’s-suffrage did
not result in an anti-republican form of government), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 571-73.
The failure of the women’s movement at that time helped to set in concrete the
conceptual division between protected classes and the tension created when a person is a
member of more than one class. For example, Black women are subject to discrimination
because they are Black women, but under our legal categories, this is often found not to be
discrimination because they are not discriminated against because of their sex by itself, and
they are not discriminated against because of their race by itself. See PAINTER, supra note
37, at 224-25; see also RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDER-ING POWER xxx (Toni Morrison
ed., 1992) (describing the interplay between race and sex in the controversy surrounding
Anita Hill and the appointment of Clarence Thomas).
38. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment protected the rights that owed their existence to the federal
government and not some broader definition of “privileges and immunities.” SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 37; see PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING
RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH
66-68 (1999). The Court also held that the Thirteenth Amendment was relevant only in
cases of chattel slavery. MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 240 (2001).
Subsequent to The Slaughter-House Cases, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1875, which prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations. Act of Mar. 1,
1875, Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336. The Supreme Court found that neither the Thirteenth nor
Fourteenth Amendments gave Congress the power to enact this law. The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12, 17-18, 22-23 (1883). The Court found that Congress lacked the
power under the Thirteenth Amendment because the Thirteenth Amendment granted only
the right to be free from the most literal forms of slavery. Id. at 22-23. Congress had a
wide view of its power under the Thirteenth Amendment to erase the “badges and
incidents” of slavery, and the Court’s narrower view created lasting impediments to racial
equality because slavery in the United States was based on a belief that Black people were
inferior.
Slavery as an economic system . . . was of small account compared with slavery
as a system of racial adjustment and social control . . . . Slavery was not the
source of the philosophy [of the biological inequality and the racial inferiority of
the Negro]. It merely enshrined it, prevented a practical demonstration of its
falsity, and filled public offices and the councils of religious, educational, and
political institutions with men reared in its atmosphere . . . . The defense of
slavery was of a social system and a system of racial adjustment, not of an
economic institution.
KONVITZ, supra note 37, at 10 (quoting DWIGHT L. DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF
THE CIVIL WAR IN THE U.S. 52 (1939)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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few efforts were made until the mid-twentieth century to address
discrimination through law.39 Commonly considered the spark
of the Black Civil Rights Movement, Brown v. Board of
Education40 was decided in 1954, when the Court declared that
racial segregation in schools violated the Equal Protection
Clause.41 After Brown helped set the stage,42 and when activists
The Fourteenth Amendment was also viewed narrowly by the Court in The Civil
Rights Cases, which held that Congress had the power to restrain only state and not private
actors. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25. Scholars have criticized the SlaughterHouse Cases and The Civil Rights Cases for having eviscerated the purpose of the
amendments. See, e.g., VORENBERG, supra note 38, at 240-41; Christopher P. Banks, The
Constitutional Politics of Interpreting Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON
L. REV. 425, 438-39 (2003).
The Fifteenth Amendment has never been applied outside of the voting rights
context. Congress, however, had a rather broad view of its power within this context. It
enacted a law almost immediately after passage of the Fifteenth Amendment that, among
other things, prohibited private parties from trying to interfere with anyone’s exercise of
the right to vote. The Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 141, reprinted in 1 STATUTORY
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 445-53 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).
The proponent of that provision argued that Congress had the power to enact any
legislation that would protect against the states’ failure to prevent interference with the
right to vote. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3611-13 (1870) (statement and
amendment of Senator Pool), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’
DEBATES, supra note 32, at 447-48. In other words, Congress had the power and the duty
to enact positive protections to ensure that people could actually exercise the right to vote.
39. The federal movement for racial equality was abandoned in 1877, and most of the
Reconstruction legislation was repealed in 1894. KONVITZ, supra note 37, at 66, 69. In
addition, other than the Nineteenth Amendment, adopted in 1920, which provided that
“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on
account of sex[,]” further national efforts to address social inequality were generally
unsuccessful. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX. There were some states, however, that passed civil rights legislation.
KONVITZ, supra note 37, at 130.
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41. Id. at 493-95.
42. Arguably, President Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights, formed in late 1946,
set the stage both for Brown and for subsequent legislation. KONVITZ, supra note 37, at
70-72. In its report, the Committee stated and recommended:
The elimination of segregation, based on race, color, creed, or national origin,
from American life.
The separate but equal doctrine has failed in three important respects. First, it is
inconsistent with the fundamental equalitarianism of the American way of life in
that it marks groups with the brand of inferior status. Secondly, where it has
been followed, the results have been separate and unequal facilities for minority
peoples. Finally, it has kept people apart despite incontrovertible evidence that
an environment favorable to civil rights is fostered whenever groups are
permitted to live and work together. There is no adequate defense of
segregation.
Id. at 72 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS
(1947)). Additionally, President Eisenhower vowed to end segregation in the District of
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undertook massive efforts at civil disobedience to integrate
Congress
began
enacting
public
accommodations,43
antidiscrimination legislation again in 1957.44 It passed a
second civil rights act in 1960,45 and finally enacted the most
sweeping and widely used antidiscrimination legislation in
1964.46
A model legal strategy for civil rights movements evolved
out of this history. After an initial period of dawning, group
awareness and local and national activism that resulted in an
organized, coherent movement, a group seeking greater civil
rights would focus its energies at the federal level by seeking a
declaration from the Supreme Court that particular
discriminatory practices violated the Constitution.47 If that topColumbia, and the Supreme Court considered segregation cases from the District before
cases involving the same issues in the states. Id. at 123.
43. Id. at 136-52; CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985) (describing the interplay
between the civil disobedience and the eventual passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
44. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634. The bill passed after
numerous compromises and after a one-person demonstration in the nature of a filibuster
by Senator Strom Thurmond, which lasted over twenty-four hours. KONVITZ, supra note
37, at 74-75.
Among other things, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 created a federal Commission
on Civil Rights, which was to investigate allegations of discrimination in voting and other
denials of equal protection, and which was to advise the federal government on equal
protection issues. Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. at 635. The Commission was to last
only two years. Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. at 635. The act focused primarily on
enforcement of voting rights. Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. at 637-38. It was very
modest, and disappointed liberals as too little and Southerners as too much. KONVITZ,
supra note 37, at 78.
The Commission issued its report in 1959 and found widespread discrimination in
voting, education, and housing. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., REPORT 545 (1959). The
report also noted the complex interrelationships of these kinds of discrimination, and noted
that Black Americans had become a sort of permanent “demoralized” underclass. Id. at
545-46, 548.
45. This act was also a modest one, due in part to a filibuster and other delay tactics
that lasted eight weeks. KONVITZ, supra note 37, at 84-89.
46. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of the Code). Originally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
most well known part of that legislation, was to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, or national origin. However, as a last-minute amendment by a Southern
Democrat, proposed as a means to defeat the bill, sex was added to the list of prohibited
classifications. 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964).
47. The women’s movement used this strategy, beginning by trying to have the
Supreme Court declare that women were entitled to civil rights under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Constitution. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
130, 133, 138 (1872). They were unsuccessful at first. The gay and lesbian civil rights
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down approach was not successful, the group would seek a
constitutional amendment and/or federal legislation outlawing
the practices.48 If those efforts were unsuccessful or struck
down by the courts, the group would head to the states or other
local bodies to try the same tactics and engage in more grassroots efforts.49 After some time and state or local successes, the
group would again focus its efforts on the federal government,
beginning with the Supreme Court and repeating the process.50
This strategy was probably chosen to maximize the effect
of group resources. There is only one federal government, while
there are fifty state governments, and thousands of smaller local
government bodies. Focusing on the federal government allows
a greater concentration of resources. Additionally, a declaration
by the highest court of any jurisdiction that the jurisdiction’s
constitution requires a certain outcome provides the most
absolute protection. For example, if the United States Supreme
Court finds that the Constitution protects a particular right or a
particular class, then no government within the United States
may restrict that right or burden that class, and governmental
bodies may be empowered to prohibit private parties from
restricting the right or burdening the class as well. Moreover,
movement also used the strategy, although much later, and it too was initially unsuccessful.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there was no fundamental right to
engage in same-sex sexual activity). The disability and age rights movements also
followed this strategy. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 433 (1985) (holding that rational basis review applied to classifications based on
disability but striking down the decision at issue nonetheless); Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (concerning mandatory retirement at a particular age).
48. For example, women won the right to vote in 1920 with the Nineteenth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. The anti-age discrimination movement won
passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in 1971. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (2000). The disability rights movement won passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1991. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). The gay and lesbian
civil rights movement, on the other hand, went straight to the states and local communities
after the defeat in Bowers. See ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GAY AND LESBIAN CIVIL RIGHTS 406 (1992).
49. After unsuccessful efforts at federal legislation, the Black civil rights movement
focused its attention on the states and won passage of some civil rights laws. KONVITZ,
supra note 37, at 130. Similarly, after Bowers, the gay and lesbian civil rights movement
focused on gaining rights in state and local communities. See MARCUS, supra note 48, at
406.
50. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (discussing sexual orientation);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (discussing gender); Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (discussing
race).
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once a court finds a right grounded in or a class protected by its
constitution, neither it nor any other court can easily roll that
protection back.51 Even if the right itself is not grounded in a
constitution, a legislature may still have the power to recognize
and protect the right under a more general type of power. And
so, even if the group is more likely to get a good result at a local
level, for maximum effect it makes sense to focus resources first
on the United States Supreme Court, then Congress, then
individual state supreme courts, then individual state
legislatures, and then other local governmental bodies.
At least in part because of this strategy, which focuses on
federal constitutional protections as an ideal, our model for
defining illegal discrimination is the Equal Protection Clause.
So, it is not surprising that when the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was passed, the Equal Protection model of illegal discrimination
would be applied to Title VII,52 the employment discrimination
provisions.
Title VII provides, in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
53
religion, sex, or national origin.
51. The Supreme Court has
“always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce
and open-ended.” By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or
liberty interest, [the Court] to a great extent, place[s] the matter outside the arena
of public debate and legislative action.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (2000).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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Section (a)(1) has been interpreted to prohibit only
intentional discrimination, which has been labeled disparate
treatment.54 Section (a)(2), on the other hand, has been
interpreted to prohibit discriminatory effects, and that theory is
labeled disparate impact.55 Even though disparate impact cases
look to effects rather than intent, “the necessary premise of the
disparate impact approach is that some employment practices,
adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in
operation be functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination.”56 In other words, some seemingly neutral
policies have hidden biases so strong that the decision-maker
may as well have used an explicit classification to keep
members of the protected class out of the job. Moreover,
despite initially giving broad effect to the disparate impact
provisions of Title VII,57 the courts have become progressively
less willing to enforce those provisions.58 Part of the reason for
54. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988); Goodman
v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 664 (1987); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 & nn. 14-15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971). However, the language of this provision would encompass a causal connection
without intent. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989) (discussing
the provision in causal terms).
55. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 986-87; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
56. Watson, 487 U.S. at 987; see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
57. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-34 (recognizing that Congress intended to prohibit
employment decisions with discriminatory consequences, not merely those with
discriminatory motivation).
58. Demonstrating its discomfort with a broad application of disparate impact, the
Court stated in Watson:
[T]he plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima facie case goes beyond the need
to show that there are statistical disparities in the employer’s work force. The
plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is
challenged . . . . Especially in cases where an employer combines subjective
criteria with the use of more rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in
our view responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.
Watson, 487 U.S. at 994; see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 65657 (1989).
In Wards Cove, the Court held that if a plaintiff could demonstrate that a
particular employment practice had produced a disparity, the employer must then produce
evidence that would show that it had a business justification for the practice. Wards Cove,
490 U.S. at 659. The burden of persuasion, however, remained with the plaintiff. Id.
Thus, a plaintiff could prevail by demonstrating that the practice did not have a business
justification. Id. at 660. Alternatively, a plaintiff could show that the same goals could be
reached without an undesirable effect. Id. at 660-61. This rule brought disparate impact
analysis almost entirely within disparate treatment analysis, with the shifting burden of
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that could be that the Equal Protection Clause has been
interpreted to prohibit only acts taken with a discriminatory
purpose and not acts that have a discriminatory effect.59
production and the opportunity to prove pretext alone, which is what the Court intended.
See id. at 660.
The Court’s holding in Wards Cove was superseded by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which provides:
(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this title only if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph
(C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent
refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice
causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining
party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice
causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate
to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not
capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed
as one employment practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not
cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate
that such practice is required by business necessity.
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance
with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of
“alternative employment practice.”
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business
necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional
discrimination under this title.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a rule barring the
employment of an individual who currently and knowingly uses or possesses a
controlled substance, as defined in schedules I and II of section 102(6) of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)), other than the use or possession
of a drug taken under the supervision of a licensed health care professional, or
any other use or possession authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or any
other provision of [f]ederal law, shall be considered an unlawful employment
practice under this title only if such rule is adopted or applied with an intent to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2.
Despite restoration of the burden of proof, some courts have resisted using the
theory, and plaintiffs usually try to style their cases as disparate treatment cases. See
Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s
Griggs Still Good for? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 598-600, 620-21 (2004)
(recognizing that lower courts are somewhat hostile to disparate impact claims and that
plaintiffs rarely bring them, but not finding a causal connection).
59. While the Court was not explicit that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit
laws or policies with a disparate impact until 1976, well after the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was passed, it had never previously found that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited laws
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Because the Equal Protection Clause serves as the paradigm for
defining illegal discrimination, any deviation from that paradigm
may seem less legitimate and more problematic. Thus, most of
the cases involving Title VII these days concern disparate
treatment, and that is where this article will focus.60
A. The McDonnell Douglas Test
After Title VII became law, employers who intentionally
discriminated quickly learned not to admit that they were taking
the particular employment action based on the person’s
protected class. Thus, direct evidence of the employer’s motive
dwindled. In 1973, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,61 the
Supreme Court set forth what is now known as the McDonnell
Douglas test which assigned burdens and order of proof in Title
VII cases that alleged discriminatory treatment but lacked direct
evidence.62 Under this test, once a plaintiff demonstrates a
prima facie case, the court presumes that discrimination has
occurred.63 The defendant must then rebut that presumption by
or actions with only discriminatory effects. Washington, 426 U.S. at 245-48. The Court
did hold that there could be circumstances in which this discriminatory purpose can be
inferred from disparate application or an extremely one-sided discriminatory effect. See
Akins, 325 U.S. at 404; Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374. However, that discriminatory effect
must be very stark to comprise evidence of discriminatory purpose. See Village of
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; see also Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 358-59, 373-74.
60. Some scholars have argued that disparate impact should be used more
extensively, since it is a significantly more flexible doctrine. See, e.g., Shoben, supra note
60. However, other scholars suggest that courts are extremely wary of disparate impact
because of its flexibility and, as a result, restrict its application severely. See, e.g.,
Malamud, supra note 4, at 2263-66. Given the Court’s decision in Wards Cove, which
essentially pulled the disparate impact standard into a replica of the disparate treatment
standard, I am inclined to side with the latter view.
61. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
62. Id. at 802. McDonnell Douglas concerned a motion to dismiss, but the rule was
set up as a method “to govern the consideration of [the plaintiff’s] claim.” Id. at 798. The
Court later made clear that this test did not apply at the point in trial where the factfinder
must make the ultimate decision. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 714-15 (1983). At trial, the straightforward issue is whether the employer
discriminated. Id. at 715. Moreover, despite the procedural posture of McDonnell
Douglas, the Court recently made clear that the test is not used to evaluate the sufficiency
of a complaint. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002).
63. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)
(building on McDonnell Douglas). The elements of the prima facie case laid out by the
Court in McDonnell Douglas, a failure to hire, race discrimination case, were: 1) the
plaintiff was a member of a racial minority; 2) the plaintiff was qualified for the job; 3) the
plaintiff was rejected by the defendant despite his qualifications; and 4) after the rejection,
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producing evidence that the employment decision at issue was
motivated by a non-discriminatory reason.64 If the defendant
produces such evidence, the plaintiff must show that the reason
given by the defendant is a pretext for discrimination.65 The
plaintiff’s membership in the protected class need not be the sole
reason for the employer’s actions; it need merely be a
motivating factor.66 The defendant cannot avoid liability at this
stage, but it can severely limit the plaintiff’s remedies if it
proves that it would have made the same decision even if the
protected characteristic had played no role in the decision.67
If, however, the defendant fails to come forward with
evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for its actions, a “court
must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact
remains in the case.”68 While the Court explained what would
happen when a defendant failed to carry its burden of
production, it did not, at that time, explain what should happen
when the employer’s stated reason is shown not to be the true
reason for its actions.69 A split developed in the lower courts on
the position remained open, and the defendant continued to seek applicants with the
plaintiff’s qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court added that
these elements were flexible and would vary in different factual situations. Id. at 802 n.13.
The generic prima facie case could be styled as: 1) the plaintiff is a member of a class
protected by statute; 2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for the job or performing
adequately; 3) the employer took some kind of adverse employment action against the
plaintiff; and 4) there is some information that suggests the reason for the decision was not
related to how the business should operate or on economics alone.
64. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53. The employer has only a burden to produce
admissible evidence. Id. at 255. Although the evidentiary burden shifts, “[t]he ultimate
burden of [persuasion] remains with the plaintiff at all times, to convince the factfinder of
intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Id. at 253, 256.
65. Id. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
66. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100-02 (2003). Before Desert
Palace, it was unclear whether, in a circumstantial case, discrimination had to be the sole
reason for the discharge, or merely a motivating reason. See id. at 95. After Desert
Palace, it is clear that whatever type of evidence proves liability, the discriminatory reason
need only be a motivating reason and not the sole reason. Id. at 101-02.
67. Id. at 95, 100-02 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
68. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
69. The courts usually define pretext as a lie. See, e.g., Russell v. Acme-Evans Co.,
51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990);
see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 602, 1187 (6th ed. 1990). However the Supreme
Court has resisted using this language, and pretext could easily include a facially neutral
reason based on a prohibited assumption or stereotype. For example, personal animosity
would be a non-discriminatory reason for an employment action but not if that personal
animosity were really sublimated racism or sexism. Compare Staggs v. Elk Run Coal Co.,
479 S.E.2d 561, 581-84 (W. Va. 1996) (recognizing that discrimination is not always
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what they should do in that situation. One group of courts held
that the effect was the same as if the employer had submitted no
evidence at all (pretext only).70 Another group of courts held
that disbelief of the employer’s stated reason had no effect, and
that the plaintiff had to provide additional specific evidence of
discrimination (pretext plus).71 The Supreme Court attempted to
resolve the split in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks72 and
clarify that a court was not required to find in favor of the
plaintiff if it found that the defendant’s stated reason was not the
real reason, but that it could do so, because an inference of
discrimination could be made from the prima facie case, and that
inference would be bolstered by the fact that the employer
offered only a cover-up.73 However, the Court only moved
more courts toward the pretext plus test by, in a majority of the
discussion, emphasizing the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion.74
The Court did resolve the issue, however, in Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,75 making clear that a court
could infer discriminatory intent from the fact that the
conscious), with State Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Sexton, 748 So. 2d 200, 213-14 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1998) (holding that there is no pretext unless there is a lie); see generally Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (recognizing that discrimination is illegal whether the animus is
conscious or sublimated into something like stereotyping); Watson, 487 U.S. at 990-91
(recognizing that subjective decisionmaking can mask reliance on stereotypes and, thus,
discrimination).
70. See Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988);
MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988); Chipollini v. Spencer
Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc); Tye v. Polaris Joint Voc. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1987); Thornbrough v. Columbus &
Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Catherine J. Lanctot, The
Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the “Pretext-Plus” Rule in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 71-75 (1991) (discussing in
detail the circuits that had clearly adopted the rule, and those that had decisions reflecting
both the pretext only and pretext plus rules).
71. See White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (1st Cir. 1984); Lanctot, supra
note 70, at 82-86 (discussing the circuits that had some decisions appearing to advocate the
pretext plus rule).
72. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
73. Id. at 511.
74. See generally id. Four circuits held that courts could make no inference from the
fact that the defendant’s reason was not the true reason. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 133 (2000);
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 56-57, 64 (1st Cir. 1999); Gillins v. Berkeley
Elec. Coop., Inc., 148 F.3d 413, 416-17 (4th Cir. 1998); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d
1332, 1344-46 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
75. 530 U.S. 133.
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employer’s reason was disbelieved,76 and that even though the
presumption of discrimination dropped out once the defendant
articulated a non-discriminatory reason for its action, a
permissive inference of discrimination remained.77 Thus, a
plaintiff may show intentional discrimination simply by proving
a prima facie case, and that the defendant’s “explanation is
unworthy of credence.”78 The McDonnell Douglas test has been
adopted, and the prima facie case has been subsequently
modified to apply to disparate treatment cases brought under
other employment discrimination statutes,79 non-employment
discrimination contexts,80 and other portions of Title VII.81
B. Despite its Flexibility, Courts Apply McDonnell Douglas
Rigidly
The Supreme Court originally designed this test as a
“sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence,”82
understanding that “[t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’
testimony to the employer’s mental processes.”83 The logic
behind the presumption created by the prima facie case was that
the Court “presume[d] these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors.”84 The Court recognized that discrimination was
76. An employer might offer a false explanation for reasons other than to cover up
discrimination. For example, the employer might be embarrassed about the real reason.
Still, it is reasonable to allow an inference of bad intent from the fact of the lack of candor
in this context just as it would be in any other evidentiary context. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at
147.
77. Id. at 142-43, 147.
78. Id. at 143 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
79. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51-53 (2003) (noting the test’s
application to the ADA); O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308,
311 (1996) (assuming without holding that the McDonnell Douglas test applies to ADEA
claims); Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506 n.1 (assuming that the test applies to cases brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
80. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (applying the test to challenges
that jurors were struck on the grounds of race).
81. See infra note 131.
82. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
83. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
84. See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. In making this statement, the Court asserted the
presumption that employers acted rationally. Id. Many scholars have taken this to mean
that the Court was assuming that employers exercise sound judgment and have
demonstrated how irrationally some employers can act. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 4,
at 2255-57. However, this cannot be what the Court meant by rational. Since it required
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pervasive but often subtle and that “the question facing triers of
fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult.”85
Title VII embodied “important national policy” which sought to
eradicate societal discrimination.86 At the same time, mental
processes and states of mind are nearly impossible to prove,
particularly in situations where the actions taken could have
been taken for any number of legitimate reasons, because the
person whose state of mind is at issue has sole access to that
information.87 Yet, the adjudicative process requires a certain
form and quality of proof.88
Consequently, in an effort to serve the policy of eradicating
discrimination, but in recognition that the intent of an actor
would be difficult to prove, the McDonnell Douglas test does
not ask whether there has been discrimination. It endeavors to
take that question out of the picture, and focuses instead on the
acts from which we can infer intent. The Court’s decision not to
have the lower courts define discrimination on the basis of a
protected class was probably deliberate. Either the Court
believed that there was a consensus, in 1973, on what
constituted discrimination, or it recognized that there was no
consensus and attempted to guide the lower courts by giving
them the tools to avoid that sticky issue.
Regardless of the exact reason, the rule has had the
opposite effect.
Despite the Supreme Court’s expansive
language about the subtlety of discrimination, the flexibility of
the test, and the broad inferences that can be drawn from
particular kinds of evidence,89 courts find for plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases significantly less frequently
than in other types of civil cases.90 Furthermore, verdicts in
the employer to merely articulate a reason that was not based on a prohibited characteristic,
it must have meant rational in a much narrower sense, to mean only that employers must be
presumed to know why they terminated an employee enough to articulate that reason. See
Selmi, supra note 11, at 326.
85. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Deborah Malamud contends that the Court created the standard to protect
employers from a more reaching standard like that used in the disparate impact analysis.
Malamud, supra note 4, at 2237.
90. See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?,
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558 (2001).
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favor of plaintiffs are more than four times as likely to be
reversed than verdicts in favor of defendants.91 While these
statistics could demonstrate many things, for example that there
are more frivolous employment discrimination cases filed than
in other civil contexts, most scholars who have done empirical
studies on verdicts and reversal rates have concluded that courts
find ways to rule for defendants in cases that fit the prohibition
of Title VII and satisfy the McDonnell Douglas test.92 In other
words, the courts are dismissing, granting summary judgment,
or (if courts of appeal) reversing judgments in meritorious cases.
Moreover, the reason cannot be that there is no longer any
discrimination: discrimination has not been eliminated; many
scholars have documented the way that discrimination continues
to operate in our society.93
The pressure posed by the national policy against
discrimination in the face of the difficulty of proving states of
mind and the form and quality of proof required in our legal
system is likely one reason that the lower courts have been so
reluctant to find in favor of plaintiffs when the McDonnell
Douglas test is applied. Other reasons could be that judges do
not believe discrimination exists or that to the extent it may, that
type of discrimination is not the kind of discrimination that the
government should penalize.94 In other words, there appears to
be no consensus on what discrimination means.
This differentiation between what types of discrimination
should and should not be penalized has deep roots, reaching
back to the debates over the Reconstruction Amendments. At
the time that the country was debating how (and whether) to
91. See Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 556-58, 566
(2003).
92. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 11, at 283-84, 309.
93. See generally FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS:
MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 75 (1995); MELVIN L. OLIVER &
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON
RACIAL INEQUALITY 45-50 (1995); DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, GENDER & RACIAL
INEQUALITY AT WORK: THE SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF JOB SEGREGATION
(1993).
94. See Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the
Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 998 (1994) (suggesting that the Court does not
believe that discrimination really still exists); Selmi, supra note 11, at 284. Amy Wax, for
example, has argued that if discrimination operates beyond normal self-awareness, it is not
properly penalized. See generally Wax, supra note 30.
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tackle the problem of race-based slavery, much of the debate
over the Reconstruction Amendments and civil rights legislation
focused on what civil rights were. Those resisting any efforts at
equality suggested that the measures proposed were targeted at
social inequality, a vague concept that tied into the
public/private dichotomy.95 Proponents of the measures denied
that they had anything to do with personal prejudices that would
force people to accept any member of a particular class into their
homes or their circle of friends.96 Yet many feminist scholars
have suggested that the public/private distinction is a social
convention often used to justify discrimination.97 For example,
because home and family are parts of the private sphere,
intimate violence was historically not penalized.98 And while
few would suggest that the government should be able to
mandate who one’s friends are, there is often little clear division
between the public and the private spheres.99 Sexual harassment
in the workplace was once thought of as private because of the
sexual component, even though it took place in the public sphere
of the workplace.100
Conversely, same-sex sodomy was
criminalized as a public wrong even when it took place in the
private realm of the home.101 Thus, relegating the entire
category of social inequality to a particular category of things
not appropriate for government regulation merely legitimizes
more subtle forms of discrimination.

95. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 344, 376-77, 379, 381-84, 56566, 616, 618, 726, 741, 900, 902 (1873-74), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 32, at 658-60, 670-71.
96. See supra note 95.
97. See, e.g., MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 642 (2d ed. 2001); Vicki Lens, Supreme
Court Narratives on Equality and Gender Discrimination in Employment: 1971-2002, 10
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 501, 520 (2004); Susan Moller Okin, Justice and Gender: An
Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537, 1551-52 (2004).
98. See generally RUTH GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS
AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 1-6 (1988); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE
VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 3-5
(1982).
99. See Okin, supra note 97, at 1551-52.
100. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
1-3 (1979) (discussing the issues presented by sexual harassment in the workplace).
101. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563-64.
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IV. THE TEST’S ECLIPSE OF THE LAW
Just as neutral policies can mask intentional discrimination,
the structure of the McDonnell Douglas test has obscured the
failure of courts to apply a stricter definition of discrimination
than exists or than is required by our antidiscrimination laws. It
allows one to get bound up in the taxonomy of the evidence,
placing each piece into a separate box and evaluating each box
separately rather than looking at the whole picture to determine
whether discrimination occurred.102 Additionally, it has allowed
us to avoid grappling with the definition of discrimination and,
for many courts, has actually defined “discrimination.”
The best example of the McDonnell Douglas test’s effect is
the split that resulted from St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks103
and led to the decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc.104 Recall, the Court in Hicks held that a trial
court is not required to enter judgment for the plaintiff if it
disbelieves the employer’s reason, but it may, as long as it
inferred from the prima facie case that the reason offered was
not the real reason and that instead discrimination was the real
reason.105 Despite this permissive language, many courts
interpreted Hicks to mean that trial courts were not allowed to
enter judgment for the plaintiff unless the plaintiff offered
specific evidence that would alone suggest discrimination.106
The courts got caught up in categorizing the evidence based
upon whether it was direct or circumstantial, or whether it was
part of the prima facie case or proof of pretext. In the process,
the courts lost sight of the ultimate issue: do the facts as a whole
102. See Malamud, supra note 4, at 2237-38, 2319-20 (arguing that abandoning the
McDonnell Douglas test would lead to a more holistic view of cases and creative
understanding of discrimination in the workplace). But see Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores
Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994) (purporting not to use the burden shifting method,
but limiting the types of circumstantial evidence, which might possibly be used to prove
discrimination, to those types comparable to the fourth prong of the prima facie case or
pretext).
103. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
104. 530 U.S. 133 (2000) [hereinafter Reeves II].
105. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11.
106. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 693-94 (5th Cir.
1999) [hereinafter Reeves I], rev’d, 530 U.S. 133; Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d
38, 56-57, 64-65 (1st Cir. 1999); Gillins v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., 148 F.3d 413, 41617 (4th Cir. 1998); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1344-46 (2d Cir. 1997) (en
banc).
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suggest that the employer discriminated?
The best illustration of the courts’ digression is the decision
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Reeves. Reeves
involved a fifty-seven-year-old factory supervisor who was
terminated after an investigation into employee timekeeping
He was replaced by someone substantially
practices.107
younger.108 Several months before his discharge, Reeves’s
supervisor said that he “was so old [that he] ‘must have come
over on the Mayflower,’” and that he “was ‘too damn old to do
[the] job.’”109 After each side rested its case, the jury found that
the discrimination against Reeves was willful, returned a verdict
in favor of Reeves, and awarded him damages.110
The Fifth Circuit reversed the jury’s verdict, holding that
Reeves had not presented enough evidence to show that
discrimination was the reason for his discharge.111 After noting
that the employer had articulated a non-discriminatory reason
for its actions, the court of appeals failed to consider the
evidence that made up the prima facie case and looked only to
the age-related comments as potential evidence of
discrimination.112 It found that those comments could not be
linked to Reeves’s discharge since they were made months
before. Without those comments, the evidence showed that
Reeves was treated like any other employee under investigation
and that there was no widespread age-based animus in the
employer’s practices.113 Thus, the court of appeals boxed each
piece of evidence into its own category, and then used those
categories to disregard the probative value of that evidence.
When the Supreme Court reversed, it admonished the Fifth
Circuit for rejecting the evidence contained in the prima facie
case and found that when viewed as a whole, the evidence
supported the verdict.114 The Court went further, as well, and
directed that a factfinder could infer a discriminatory motive
from the fact that the reason offered by the employer for its
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Reeves II, 530 U.S. at 137-38.
Reeves was replaced by a succession of three people in their thirties. Id. at 142.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 139.
Reeves I, 197 F.3d at 694.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 693-94.
Reeves II, 530 U.S. at 142, 146.
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action was not the real reason.115
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves resolved the
issue in that particular case, it has not solved the problems
associated with the boxing of evidence.116 Although McDonnell
Douglas has been called an empty ritual because courts focused
primarily on the pretext prong for a number of years,117 Reeves
revitalized the power of the prima facie case.118 Courts are more
frequently examining whether the plaintiff has provided
evidence of a prima facie case.119 And, the elements of the
prima facie case are being applied very rigidly. For example,
one way to show that the plaintiff’s prohibited characteristic was
the reason for an employer’s action is to show that someone
outside the plaintiff’s class was treated better under substantially
similar circumstances. Yet some courts have taken it too far and
found this comparator evidence a necessary part of the prima
facie case.120 However, that is not the only way to show that the
prohibited characteristic was the reason for the employer’s
action. For example, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,121
comparative evidence was unnecessary. It was irrelevant that
some women could become partners at the accounting firm.122
115. Id. at 146.
116. See Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law,
61 LA. L. REV. 577, 592-99 (2001). Zimmer notes that the Court in Reeves failed to
address the process that the Fifth Circuit used in categorizing the evidence, and this failure
means that lower courts continue to get caught up in the taxonomy. Id. at 591-99.
117. See Chin & Golinsky, supra note 4 (arguing that McDonnell Douglas should be
discarded because it is an empty ritual that courts no longer employ).
118. See Zimmer, supra note 116, at 600.
119. See, e.g., Hudson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2004);
Steinhauer v. DeGolier, 359 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2004). In fact, in a case in which the
defendant conceded that a prima facie case had been made, the Seventh Circuit
nevertheless found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of one. Davis v.
Con-Way Transp. Cent. Express, Inc., 368 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2004).
120. In fact, some courts even require evidence that a comparator was treated more
favorably as an element of the prima facie case. See, e.g., Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108
F.3d 621, 624 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) (recognizing a split within the Fifth Circuit concerning
whether it was an element of the prima facie case but not requiring it); Suggs v.
ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir. 1996); Edwards v. Wallace
Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1995); Simens v. Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 10
(D.D.C. 1997); see also Marla Swartz, Note, The Replacement Dilemma: An Argument for
Eliminating a Non-Class Replacement Requirement in the Prima Facie Stage of Title VII
Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination Claims, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1338 (2003)
(discussing how various courts have used and required evidence of comparators).
121. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
122. See id. at 233, 251-52.
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It did not matter that men who exhibited the same behaviors as
plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, were promoted to partner.123 The
problem was that Hopkins was not promoted because she was a
woman who acted too manly.124
Categorizing the evidence is not the only way that courts
and litigants get caught up in the principles that the McDonnell
Douglas taxonomy promotes. Courts are importing the test as if
the test defines what violates the statute at issue rather than
being a way to infer intent with the idea that discrimination
operates in the background. In fact, sometimes the test is
imported into areas where it is simply inapplicable. A prime
example of this improper importation is retaliation under Title
VII. Title VII prohibits retaliation by employers for opposing
any unlawful employment practice or participating in
proceedings under Title VII.125 The only question relevant to a
retaliation charge is whether the employer took some act and
whether the employer took the act because the employee
opposed an unlawful employment practice or participated in
proceedings under Title VII.126 However, where there is no
direct evidence of the employer’s intent, courts use the
McDonnell Douglas test to determine whether retaliation has
occurred. One element of that test is whether the employee
suffered an adverse employment action.127 While a modified
version of the test could be useful to isolate the evidence that
might show the employer’s intent, the courts have not modified
the test to remove the adverse action requirement, a requirement
that has nothing to do with the intent of the actor. The circuits
are split on what constitutes an employment action adverse
123. See id. at 236.
124. See id. at 251-52.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). Specifically, it prohibits employers from
“discriminat[ing] against any . . . employees or applicants for employment . . . because
[they have] opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because [they have] made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a).
126. See Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment
Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the
“Personality” Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 188-89 (1997); Stephen W.
Smith, Title VII’s National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie
Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 381 (1997).
127. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (requiring the plaintiff to show that he
was not hired in a failure to hire case).
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enough, in the context of retaliation, to provide a person a cause
of action.128
However, no court has questioned the utility of using
McDonnell Douglas in the first instance, particularly the adverse
job action requirement.129 That requirement makes sense in the
context of Title VII, which prohibits an employer from
“discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to . . .
compensation,
terms,
conditions,
or
privileges
of
employment . . . .”130
This language suggests that only
discrimination that results in adverse employment actions will
be actionable. The retaliation provision, on the other hand,
prohibits “discrimination” without any qualifiers,131 and thus
mere differentiation should be sufficient.
Another, even more glaring example is the importation of
the test into the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).
FMLA requires covered employers to allow covered employees
to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for a newly
born or adopted child, a family member, or the employee’s own
serious health condition.132 In addition, it gives employees a
cause of action against employers who “interfere with, restrain,
or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right
provided under [FMLA].”133 Despite the fact that interference
with rights is much broader than discrimination and looks to the
effects of actions rather than the intent of actors,134 some courts
128. A few courts have required that plaintiffs demonstrate that they suffered an
“ultimate” job action, such as termination. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg.
Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531-32 (5th Cir. 2003); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d
1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997). Others require that the action be “materially adverse,”
although it need not be an ultimate action. Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir.
2000); Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2000); Heno v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847, 857 (10th Cir. 2000); Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of
N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1997); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286,
1300 (3d Cir. 1997); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit
and the EEOC have adopted the view that any treatment reasonably likely to deter
protected activity constitutes retaliation. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th
Cir. 2000); EEOC, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8 (2002).
129. The approach of the Ninth Circuit and the EEOC comes closest to removing the
requirement altogether.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (2000).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2000).
134. See Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 960-61 (10th Cir.
2002); Bachelder v. America W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2001);
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have imported the McDonnell Douglas test into the FMLA.135
Thus, many actions that could be said to interfere with an
employee’s exercise of rights have not been found to violate the
FMLA despite the act’s plain language.
Finally, the taxonomy promoted by McDonnell Douglas,
particularly the issue of comparators, has so fully infected our
thinking about what discrimination is that the Supreme Court
has fallen into the trap in its recent decision in General
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline.136 Cline involved the
question of whether an employer violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) by treating
workers over forty less favorably because of their age than
workers over fifty.137 The antidiscrimination provision of the
ADEA prohibits employers from “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire
or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual . . . because of such individual’s age . . . .”138
However, not everyone is protected from age discrimination:
the class of workers protected by the ADEA is limited to those
forty and older; which leaves workers under forty
unprotected.139 The plain meaning of the two sections suggests
that as long as a person is in the protected class, an employer
may not rest decisions affecting that person on that person’s
age.140
This interpretation comports with the interpretation of
see generally Martin H. Malin, Interference with the Right to Leave Under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 329 (2003) (arguing that the
FMLA should be interpreted in the same way as the National Labor Relations Act, which
prohibits interference with the right to organize).
135. See Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 768 (5th Cir. 2002);
Nichols v. Ashland Hosp. Corp., 251 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 2001); Brungart v. Bellsouth
Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798 (11th Cir. 2000); Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209
F.3d 1008, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000); Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019-20 (Evans, J., dissenting); Gleklen
v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., 199 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Hodgens v.
General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 160-72 (1st Cir. 1998); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108
F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997).
136. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
137. See id. at 581.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000).
140. See Cline, 540 U.S. at 602-05 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Cline v. General
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 469-71 (6th Cir. 2002); Cline, 296 F.3d at 472-75
(Cole, J., concurring). The primary meaning of the word “age” is chronological age—the
length of time that a person has been alive. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 33 (3d ed.
1992).
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nearly identical language in Title VII, which provides that
employers may not “fail or refuse to hire or . . . discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin . . . .”141 That language has been
interpreted to prohibit decisions made because of a prohibited
characteristic, rather than membership in a subset of the class
defined. In other words, white people may sue if they are
discriminated against because they are white, men may sue if
they are discriminated against because they are men, and so on,
even though Title VII was originally passed to promote equality
for African-Americans, women, and other disempowered
groups.142
The application of these principles seems relatively simple
in the abstract. In Cline, the employer decided to take away
future benefits at retirement for those employees between forty
and fifty based solely on their current age.143 This was direct
evidence that the employer was motivated to take action solely
because of age. Based on the plain language of the statute,
stating that employers cannot discriminate because of an
individual’s age, this action should have been held to violate the
ADEA. Because it was a direct evidence case, McDonnell
Douglas considerations should never have entered the picture.
However, there was a wrinkle presented by Cline. Employees
over fifty would have greater benefits when they retired, and
they retained these benefits in part because the employer cut
benefits for the younger employees.144 Thus, the same action
that harmed one group of employees within the protected class
helped another group also within the protected class.
The presence of these comparators confused the issue.
Suddenly the issue was no longer the employer’s intent. The
employer’s intent was undisputedly to classify on the basis of
age.
Instead, the question became whether the ADEA
prohibited classifying on the basis of age when that
classification benefited one segment of the protected class—not
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
142. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
143. Cline, 540 U.S. at 584.
144. Id.
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just any segment of that class, but the segment with the greatest
amount of, for lack of a better word, protectedness. Even
though the language of the ADEA was clear, the Court just
could not conceive of Congress intending to protect all members
of the class equally. And so, in a very tortured line of reasoning,
the Court found that Congress meant “relatively older age”
when it used the word “age,”145 and that the members of the
protected class were protected only when they were harmed in
favor of relatively younger members of the class.146 This cannot
be distinguished from Title VII by the fact that the comparators
were members of the same class. We know from Price
Waterhouse that it is still sex discrimination if a woman does not
receive a benefit because she is not womanly enough.147
Certainly, no court would find that refusing to offer benefits to a
group of Black people because they were not Black enough was
legal under Title VII.148
Further demonstrating the confusion engendered by the
desire to look at comparators, the Court looked to one of its
prior decisions applying the McDonnell Douglas test in an
ADEA case for guidance even though this was a direct evidence
case, and the test would not be used.149 In the prior case,
O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,150 the Court
applied the McDonnell Douglas test to a case under the ADEA
in which a fifty-six-year-old was discharged and replaced with a

145. This analysis was tortured because the Court failed to follow the rules of statutory
construction, which it has been adhering to very closely for at least the past few years. See
Rafael Gely, Supreme Court’s 2002 Term Employment Law Cases: Is This the Scalia
Court?, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 254 (2003) (describing the Court’s recent
adherence to the primary rule of statutory construction). It began by looking to the
legislative history, gave no weight to an EEOC regulation, and allowed the word “age” to
mean different things in different parts of the ADEA. Cline, 540 U.S. at 585-99.
146. Cline, 540 U.S. at 590-91.
147. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251-52.
148. Moreover, the reasoning cannot be explained along affirmative action lines.
There is no good analogy to affirmative action. Race-based decisions are valid under Title
VII as long as they are made pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan. See generally
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 433 U.S. 193 (1979). However, affirmative action
involves distinctions between classes, both of which might be protected, but not
distinctions within classes. This view that classes are truly distinct, and that they do not
involve a continuum may be inaccurate, but that is the view embodied in the law.
149. Cline, 540 U.S. at 592-93.
150. 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
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forty-year-old.151 The district court granted summary judgment
on the ground that O’Connor could not make out a prima facie
case of age discrimination because he was replaced by someone
within his protected class.152 The Supreme Court held in
O’Connor that the class membership of the replacement was
irrelevant, and that an inference that age was the reason for the
employer’s decision could be made since the replacement was
“substantially younger.”153
The Court in Cline took that point out of context, and
inflated its importance. It ignored its prior reasoning in
O’Connor, which recognized:
The discrimination prohibited by the ADEA is
discrimination “because of [an] individual’s age,” 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), though the prohibition is “limited to
individuals who are at least [forty] years of age,” § 631(a).
This language does not ban discrimination against
employees because they are aged [forty] or older; it bans
discrimination against employees because of their age, but
limits the protected class to those who are [forty] or older.
The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out
to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so
154
long as he has lost out because of his age.

Thus, the reasoning in O’Connor would have supported
interpreting the ADEA according to the plain meaning of the
statutory language. But the end result, the discussion of the
comparator, and the presence of a comparator class in Cline,
allowed the Court to interpret the ADEA as if the McDonnell
Douglas test defines unlawful discrimination.
V. THE BETTER TEST
Given that the McDonnell Douglas test as applied is so
flawed, and courts have proven so resistant to moving away
from the most narrow interpretations of it, I suggest replacing it
with a much simpler test. Judges155 are just as prone to
151. Id. at 309-10.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 311-12.
154. Id. at 312 (emphasis in original).
155. Members of juries, as well, would be just as prone to cognitive bias as anyone,
but I do not address them here for several reasons. First, juries are made up of several
people who must make decisions by consensus. The more balanced the jury in terms of
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cognitive bias and unreflective discrimination as the rest of
us.156 Any test that fails to account for this fact is doomed to the
same fate as the McDonnell Douglas test. Thus, I propose
coming at the ultimate issue from the opposite angle, to reaffirm
the notion that discrimination is not merely an exception to the
rule.
In pre-trial proceedings or proceedings to set aside a
judgment, the explicit, and only question for the court is whether
a minimally rational factfinder would be required to find that the
employer took an adverse employment action against the
plaintiff solely because of a reason unrelated to discrimination
or discriminatory beliefs. Only if a minimally rational factfinder
would be required to find that the employer acted for reasons
unrelated to discrimination would the employer be granted
summary judgment or the judgment of the jury be set aside.
Otherwise, the case should either proceed to a trial or the
judgment of the jury should stand.
This formulation of the test requires no taxonomy of the
evidence. Rather, it requires the court to look at the evidence as
a whole with the ultimate issue at trial in mind, just like in any
other type of civil litigation. Thus, it runs significantly less risk
that the court will get so caught up in boxing the evidence into
separate categories that it loses sight of the permissible
inferences from that evidence.
Using a test that is so much more holistic may concern
litigants and judges that the lack of defined standards will fail to
give lower courts sufficient guidance. However, sociological
research indicates that more complicated environments and
class, race, gender, etc., the more likely that the biases of one group would be negated by
the understandings of other jurors. Second, judges are not employees in the normal sense
even if they are state judges who are elected. No one with authority can direct them in
doing their jobs, with the limited exception of a higher court overturning a decision on
appeal or directing a non-discretionary act through a writ of mandamus. Yet, nearly all
judges are employers, or at least must manage their law clerks, secretaries, and other
assistants. Thus, judges are likely to identify with employers as fellow members of an ingroup. The vast majority of jurors are more likely to be employees and not employers or
managers, or at least employees in addition to being managers. Thus, jurors are less likely
to identify with the employer. Third, judges are left wholly to their own discretion in
deciding how the law applies to the facts. Jurors are given instructions, which can be
designed to guide that application in a way that would avoid the effects of cognitive bias.
156. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 829-30
(2001).
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instances with greater economic interests at stake result in
tightly bound rules providing less stable outcomes than do more
loosely defined principles.157 It is difficult, the more strict and
specific the rules, to apply them to situations that vary from the
model for which the rules were designed. Certainly, the
workplace is a complicated environment, particularly when
discrimination is at issue. The norms governing what constitutes
discrimination are in flux; any workplace’s system of
interpersonal interaction will be highly complex, and every case
has high economic stakes. Given the complicated nature of the
issues then, employment discrimination cases are much better
suited to broader principles than bound rules.
The test might also give judges difficulty by requiring them
to define what discrimination is, something the current
McDonnell Douglas test does not explicitly require as part of the
legal analysis. However, underlying every single judgment as to
what inferences can be drawn and where the pieces of evidence
fit, is the judge’s view of discrimination. And that view is never
exposed or subject to challenge. So giving the parties the
opportunity to present expert testimony on what discrimination
is and how it operates will result at the very least in
documentation in the record about what definition of
discrimination a judge is using. This, in turn will foster public
debate, may lead to congressional action, and could lead us
closer as a society to consensus on the issue. For example, one
of the most noteworthy things about Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins158 is that Hopkins presented expert testimony on
cognitive bias and the operation of stereotypes, and this
evidence influenced the Supreme Court’s discussion of why the
beliefs held about Hopkins were discriminatory.159 After Price
Waterhouse, more people, judges included, understand better
how stereotypes are manifestations of discrimination.
Another consequence of the test is that fewer cases will be
disposed of on summary judgment, and thus, more cases will go
to trial. While this increase in the federal court caseload might
appear to be a bad outcome due to a desire for judicial
157. See John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27
AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 47 (2002).
158. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
159. Id. at 235-36, 251-52.
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efficiency, the answer is not to grant summary judgment more
frequently. Meritorious cases with evidence on both sides
should go to trial.160 That is what the statute requires and the
purpose served by the summary judgment procedure. If
caseloads are too heavy, the government should create more
judicial positions, more ancillaries to judges, or an
administrative adjudication procedure. It should not allow trial
by affidavit.161
Using this test will also make the inquiry at trial much
more straightforward. At trial, the factfinder should focus
simply on whether the plaintiff has shown that the employer
took the adverse job action for a reason related to
discrimination. That is the only inquiry that matters, as the
Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear.162 Moreover, using
this test resolves the question of how to incorporate the
employer’s affirmative defense, that it would have taken the
same action without the prohibited reason, which the Supreme
Court recently made clear applies in circumstantial cases as well
as direct evidence cases.163 Without the trips and traps of
McDonnell Douglas, the real issues can come out, and courts
can take a much more realistic look at discrimination in the
workplace.
VI. CONCLUSION
As these examples demonstrate, while the McDonnell
Douglas test was originally designed to recognize the subtlety of
discriminatory practices and to make the inquiry into the
employer’s intent easier, it has instead frustrated the operation of
our antidiscrimination laws. The alternative test that I propose
restores the original understanding of the Court, that
discrimination operates throughout our society and that when the
160. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliche’s Eroding Our Day in Court and
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (arguing that courts are relying
on summary judgment to resolve factual issues); Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary
Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141 (2000) (making the same argument).
161. See Mollica, supra note 160, at 152 (quoting Benton-Volvo-Metairie, Inc. v.
Volvo Southwest, Inc., 479 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1973)).
162. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000); St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993).
163. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003).
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most common reasons for an adverse employment action are
rejected, all that remains is an inference that discrimination was
the real reason. The ultimate burden on the plaintiff is the same,
and the employer retains the same opportunity to suggest that
the real reason was a legitimate one, but the courts’ perspective
better reflects the pervasive and subtle nature of discrimination
in the workplace.
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